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We provide a quantum gambling protocol using three
(symmetric) nonorthogonal states. The bias of the pro-
posed protocol is less than that of previous ones, making it
more practical. We show that the proposed scheme is secure
against nonentanglement attacks. The security of the pro-
posed scheme against entanglement attacks is shown heuris-
tically.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unforgeable quantum money proposed by Wiesner [1]
opened the field of ‘quantum cryptography’. The most
successful of the quantum cryptographic protocols is
Bennett and Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol [2], whose unconditional security was
proved more than a decade later [3]. Since another very
useful ingredient in cryptographic tasks is the bit com-
mitment, there has been much effort to find an uncondi-
tionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol. How-
ever, it turns out that no such thing exists [4,5]. This
fact motivated the search for a slightly weaker protocol,
quantum coin tossing. However, it turns out that the
ideal quantum coin tossing protocol also does not exist
[6]. It is still an open question whether almost ideal quan-
tum coin tossing exists or not [7]. However, it was found
that there exists a quantum gambling protocol that is
weaker than quantum coin tossing [8].
We can say that the quantum money and the BB84
protocol are based on a basic property of quantum me-
chanics, the no-cloning theorem [9,10]. Another closely
related but different property in quantum mechanics is
that nonorthogonal quantum states cannot be distin-
guished with certainty [11]. It is interesting to search
for quantum protocols utilizing this property. Bennett’s
later QKD scheme indeed utilizes this property [12]. Re-
cently, Hwang et al. gave a quantum gambling scheme
that utilizes this basic property [13].
The two quantum gambling protocols [8,13] are not
ideal in the sense that there is a bias δ > 0: It is an
unfair game by the amount of the bias δ. That is, for each
round of the game the expectation value of one party’s
gain is given by the bias δ. However, since the bias δ is
proportional to 1/
√
R where R is the money penalty, the
bias δ can be made negligible by making R very large in
both schemes [8,13].
In this paper, we provide a quantum gambling proto-
col using three nonorthogonal states. In the proposed
scheme, two participants Alice and Bob can be regarded
as playing a game of making guesses at the identities of
quantum states that are in one of three given nonorthog-
onal states: If Bob makes a correct (incorrect) guess at
the identity of a quantum state that Alice has sent, he
wins (loses). We show that the proposed scheme is secure
against non-entanglement attacks. The security of the
proposed scheme against entanglement attacks is shown
heuristically. However, since the idea behind the proof
is simple, we believe that a rigorous one will be found as
in the case of the QKD [3,14,15]. The advantage of the
proposed scheme over previous ones is that the bias δ is
proportional to 1/R. We discuss this advantage.
II. QUANTUM GAMBLING USING THREE
NONORTHOGONAL STATES
Let us now describe the three symmetric nonorthog-
onal states to be used in the protocol. Let {pi, |i〉〈i|}
denote a mixture of pure states |i〉〈i| with relative fre-
quency pi with
∑
i pi = 1. ρ =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| is a den-
sity operator that corresponds to the mixture {pi, |i〉〈i|}.
Any pure quantum bits (qubits) |i〉〈i| can be represented
by a (three-dimensional Euclidean) Bloch vecter rˆi as
|i〉〈i| = (1/2)(1 + rˆi · ~σ) [16]. Here 1 is the identity
operator, ~σ = (σx, σy , σz), and σx, σy, σz are the Pauli
operators. The Bloch vectors of the three nonorthog-
onal states |a〉, |b〉, and |c〉 are in the same plane and
make an angle 2π/3 with one another to be symmetric.
Here we adopt |a〉 = |0〉, |b〉 = 1/2|0〉 + √3/2|1〉, and
|c〉 = 1/2|0〉 − √3/2|1〉, where |0〉 and |1〉 denote two
mutually orthogonal states of a qubit as usual.
Let us now give the protocol.
(1) Alice randomly chooses one among the three
nonorthogonal states |a〉, |b〉, and |c〉, and sends it to
Bob.
(2) On the qubit he receives, Bob performs an optimal
measurement, that is, a measurement by which he can
obtain the maximal probability p of correctly guessing
the identity of the qubit.
(3) On the basis of the measurement’s results, he makes a
guess at which one the qubit is and annouces it to Alice.
(4) If he made a correct (incorrect) guess, Alice an-
nounces he has won (lost).
(5) When Bob has won, Alice gives him one coin. When
he has lost, Bob gives her p/(1− p) coins.
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However, after the first step, Bob follows the following
steps 6 − 9 instead of steps 2 − 5, at randomly chosen
instances with a rate r (0 < r ≪ 1).
(6) Bob performs no measurement on the qubit and stores
it.
(7) He announces his randomly chosen guess at the iden-
tity of the qubit.
(8) Step 4 is repeated.
(9) In the previous step, Alice has actually revealed which
one she chose to tell him the qubit is (regardless of her
honesty). When it is |α〉 (α = a, b, c), Bob performs Sˆα.
(Sˆα is an orthogonal measurement that is composed of
two projection operators |α〉〈α| and |α′〉〈α′|. Here |α′〉
is a normalized state that is orthogonal to |α〉.) If the
outcome is |α′〉, Bob announces that he performed Sˆα
and got |α′〉 as an outcome. Then Alice must give him
R (≫ 1) coins. If the outcome is |α〉, Bob says nothing
about which measurement he performed and follows step
5. ✷
As in the two-state scheme [13], it is important in step
2 for Bob to perform the optimal measurement that as-
sures maximal probability p of correctly guessing the
identity of the qubit, in order to assure his maximal
gain. The optimal measurment for the three nonorthog-
onal states |α〉 was recently given [17]. It is a positive
operator valued measurement (POVM) [18] whose com-
ponent operators are, interestingly, proportional to the
three operaters |α〉〈α| [17]. That is, they are (2/3)|a〉〈a|,
(2/3)|b〉〈b|, and (2/3)|c〉〈c|. Now it is easy to see that the
maximal probability p is 2/3.
III. SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL
Now let us show how each player’s average gain is as-
sured. (Here we repeat the corresponding part of Ref.
[13] in a slightly varied form.)
First it is clear by definition that Bob can do nothing
better than performing the optimal measurement, as long
as Alice prepares the specified qubits. In the protocol,
the numbers of coins that Alice and Bob pay are adjusted
so that no one gains when Bob’s win probability is p.
Thus Bob’s gain GB cannot be greater than zero, that
is, GB ≤ 0.
Next let us consider Alice’s strategy. As noted above,
we first show the security against Alice’s nonentangle-
ment attacks. Roughly speaking, Alice can do nothing
but prepare the given states |α〉 and honestly tell Bob
the identity of the state later. Otherwise she must pay R
(≫ 1) coins to him sometimes, making her gain negative.
Let us consider this more precisely. In the most general
nonentanglement attacks, Alice randomly generates each
qubit in a state |i〉 with a probability pi. Here the |i〉’s
are arbitrarily specified states of qubits, i = 1, 2, ..., N
and
∑N
i pi = 1. However, since Bob has no informa-
tion about which |i〉 Alice has selected at each instance,
his treatments of the qubits actually become equal for
all qubits. Thus it is sufficient to show the security for
a qubit in an arbitrary state. Let us denote the angles
that the Bloch vector of a state |i〉 makes with those of
|α〉 as θα. At ramdomly chosen instances with a rate
r, Bob checks Alice’s claim by measuring Sˆα when the
claim is that the state is |α〉 (the steps 6−9). If the mea-
surement’s outcomes are |α′〉, the claim is proved wrong.
Then Alice must give BobR coins. The probability that a
state |i〉 is checked is |〈α′|i〉|2 = 1−cos2(θα/2) in the case
when the checking measurement Sˆα is performed. Thus
one term in Alice’s gain GA is −rR[1−cos2(θα/2)] where
rR is set to be much larger than 1. Now it is simple to
see that Alice should prepare only states that are highly
nonorthogonal to one of the |α〉’s. Thus one of the θα is
very small. Otherwise, Alice’s gain GA will be dominated
by highly negative term −rR[1− cos2(θα/2)] in any case.
Similarly we can see that she should claim the prepared
state to be the one that is nearest to it. Here it should
be noted that we should take into account the fact that
Alice obtains partial information about whether Bob has
performed the measurement or not, due to Bayes’ rule.
However, Alice still cannot increase her gain as long as
the R is large enough, because she cannot be confident
that Bob has already performed the measurement. Let fu
be Alice’s estimation of the probability that Bob did not
perform the measurement. With no information, fu is r.
However, Bob’s announced guess gives her partial infor-
mation about his measurement’s result if he performed it.
This information can be used to make a better estimate
of fu. For example, in the case where Alice sends |α〉 and
Bob performs the optimal measurement, we obtain using
Bayes’ rule that fu = (r/3)/[(r/3) + (1 − r)(2/3)] when
his guess is |α〉. However, it is clear that fu ≥ r/3: when
Bob did not perform the measurement, he simply guesses
it with equal probabilities regardless of what he received.
Thus, by Bayes’ rule, Alice can see that there remains
a probability greater than r/3 that Bob did not perform
the measurement. The relation fu ≥ r/3 also holds for
the entanglement attacks, since it is satisfied for any |α〉.
Now let us consider a state |i〉 that satisfies the re-
quirements θa ∼ 0, θb ∼ 2π/3, and θc ∼ 2π/3, without
loss of generality. The probability PC that Bob makes
a correct guess is given by PC = (2/3) cos
2(θa/2). That
for an incorrect one is given by PI = 1−PC . Alice’s gain
is −1 (2) when Bob makes a correct (incorrect) guess.
Let us denote Alice’s gain GnA (G
c
A) in the case of the
normal (checking) steps. Alice’s total gain is given by
GA = (1 − r)GnA + rGcA. Alice’s gain GnA in the case of
the normal steps can be obtained as
GnA = (−1)(2/3) cos2(θa/2) + 2{1− (2/3) cos2(θa/2)}
= 2{1− cos2(θa/2)}. (1)
Alice’s gain GcA in the case of the checking steps (when
Alice claims that the sent qubit is |a〉) is given by
2
GcA = −R[1− cos2(θa/2)] + cos2(θa/2). (2)
The second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is
because Bob makes a random guess without performing
the optimal measurement in the checking steps and thus
it is disadvantageous for him. Then we can obtain that
GA = (1− r)2{1− cos2(θa/2)} − rR{1− cos2(θa/2)}
+r cos2(θa/2)
= {2− r(R + 2)}{1− cos2(θa/2)}+ r cos2(θa/2). (3)
Here it is easy to see that if r(R + 2) ≫ 2 the opti-
mal choice for Alice is that θa = 0. Then the maximal
gain for Alice is given by GmaxA = r. If we determine
the values of r and R such that they satisfy the relation
r(R + 2) = k ≫ 2 (k is a constant), Alice’s maximal
gain or the bias δ is r. Thus the bias δ is proportional
to 1/R. The basic reason for this advantage is that the
measured states |α〉 coincide with the elements of the
optimal POVM in the proposed scheme. Alice could in-
crease her gain GnA for the normal steps by increasing θa
in both two- and three-state schemes but with the fol-
lowing difference. In the three-state (two-state) scheme,
GnA increases with the second (first) order of θa while the
probability to be checked increases with the second order
of θa.
Let us heuristically show the security against Alice’s
entanglement attacks. In entanglement attacks, she does
not send a separate state but sends qubits that are en-
tangled with some other qubits she preserves. If she
can change Bob’s state ρB as she likes, she can always
win. The basic idea is that she cannot do so even in
entanglement attacks. Instead, by appropriately choos-
ing her measurement, Alice can generate at Bob’s site
any ensemble {pi, |i〉〈i|} satisfying
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| = ρB (the
theorem of Hughston, Jozsa, and Wootters) [19]. Let
ρB = (1/2)(1+ rˆ · ~σ). Since ρB =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| and |i〉〈i| =
(1/2)(1+ rˆi ·~σ) where rˆi is the corresponding Bloch vec-
tor, we have (1/2)(1+ rˆ ·~σ) = (1/2)(1+[∑i pirˆi] ·~σ) and
thus
rˆ =
∑
i
pirˆi. (4)
Therefore, for a given ρB whose Bloch vector is rˆ, Al-
ice can prepare at Bob’s site any mixture {pi, |i〉〈i|} as
long as its Bloch vectors rˆi satisfy Eq. (4). However, if
Alice always performs a given measurement, the entan-
glement attacks reduce to the nonentanglement attacks:
The outcomes of measurements on entangled pairs do not
depend on the temporal order of the two participants’
measurements. So we can confine ourselves to the case
where Alice measures first. Then the attack reduces to
a nonentanglement attack where Alice generates |i〉 with
probability pi. The only thing that Alice can do to utilize
the entanglement is to choose her measurements accord-
ing to Bob’s announced guesses. However, the checking
steps also prevent Alice from increasing her gain: She
must choose the measurement that gives some mixture
{pi, |i〉〈i|} at Bob’s site such that each rˆi is the same
as one of the Bloch vectors of the three nonorthogonal
states |α〉. This is because any vector rˆi that deviates
from those of the |α〉’s will decrease Alice’s gain due to
the checking steps, involving a negative term containing
rR. Therefore, Alice has no freedom in the choice of mea-
surements but a given choice. Thus the attack reduces
to nonentanglement attacks for the reasons noted above.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Let us discuss the advantage of the proposed scheme.
The problem of quantum gambling schemes is that Alice
can claim that the error is due to noise or decoherence
in the quantum channel, whenever it is checked and thus
she must pay R to Bob. This problem cannot be clearly
solved even if quantum error correcting codes [16] are
successfully implemented because a small amount of error
always remains. The solution to this problem is that Bob
aborts the whole protocol if the error rate claimed by Al-
ice is greater than the expected residual error rate. How-
ever, Bob should actually accept his loss which amounts
to the product of the number of errors and R, until data
for a sufficient number of errors accumulate. Thus it is
hard for Bob to do so when R is too large. However, in
the previous schemes (proposed scheme), we have that
R ∼ 1/δ2 (R ∼ 1/δ), namely, for a given bias the value
of R of the proposed scheme is less than that of the pre-
vious schemes by a factor of 1/δ. Therefore we can say
that the proposed scheme is more practical than previous
ones.
In conclusion, we provided a quantum gambling pro-
tocol using three (symmetric) nonorthogonal states. We
showed that the proposed scheme is secure against nonen-
tanglement attacks. The security of the proposed scheme
against entanglement attacks was shown heuristically.
The advantage of the proposed scheme over previous ones
is that the bias δ is proportional to 1/R. We discussed
its practical advantage.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are very grateful to Professor Hiroshi Imai and the
Japan Science Technology Corporation for financial sup-
port. We are also very grateful to Dr. Alberto Carlini
for helpful discussions.
3
∗ Present address: Tech. – L 359, Center for Photonic Com-
munication and Computing, Northwestern University, 2145
N Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-3118, USA; Email
address: wyhwang@ece.northwestern.edu
† Email address: keiji@qci.jst.go.jp
[1] S. Wiesner, Sigact News 15(1), 78 (1983).
[2] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
on Computers, systems, and signal processing, Bangalore
(IEEE, New York, 1984) p.175.
[3] D. Mayers, J. Assoc. Comput. Mach. 48, 351 (2001).
[4] H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3410 (1997).
[5] D. Mayers, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3414 (1997).
[6] H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau, Physica D 120, 177 (1998).
[7] A. Ambainis, in Preceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual
ACM Symposium of Theory of Computing, p. 134 (ACM,
2001).
[8] L. Goldenberg, L. Vaidman, and S. Wiesner, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 82, 3356 (1999).
[9] W.K. Wootters and W. Zurek, Nature 229, 802 (1982).
[10] D. Dieks, Phys. Lett. A 92, 271 (1982).
[11] H. P. Yuen, Phys. Lett. A 113, 405 (1986).
[12] C.H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[13] W.Y. Hwang, D. Ahn, and S.W. Hwang, Phys. Rev. A 64,
064302 (2001).
[14] P.W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[15] H.-K. Lo and H.F. Chau, Science 283, 2050 (1999).
[16] M.A. Nielsen and I.L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and
Quantum Information (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 2000).
[17] E. Andersson, S. M. Barnett, C.R. Gilson, and K. Hunter,
Phys. Rev. A 65, 052308 (2002).
[18] A. Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods
(Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993), Chap. 9.
[19] L.P. Hughston, R. Jozsa, and W.K. Wootters, Phys. Lett.
A 183, 14 (1993).
4
